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THE BATTLE OVER COMBAT:
A PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE
COMBATANT ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION TO
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
MICHAEL KUTNER†
INTRODUCTION
The combatant activities exception to the Federal Tort
Claims Act is a preservation of sovereign immunity from liability
for injuries resulting from the “combatant activities” of the
United States military.1 The exception is designed to protect the
undeniably compelling government interest of defending the
nation from harm without the burden of liability for action
necessary to achieve that goal.2 It addresses the concern that
imposing tort liability on the military could lead to a chilling
effect on decision-making that would cause hesitation to act in
the interest of national defense.3 To that end, the exception has
in recent years been applied by federal courts in such a way as to
effect a policy of “elimination of tort from the battlefield”
entirely.4 At first glance, this interpretation seems quite neatly
tailored to reflect the exception’s goal. After all, it can hardly be
said that the federal government intended to waive its sovereign
immunity with respect to battlefield injuries caused by the
direction of force towards enemy combatants. Viewing this
interpretation in the context of the exception’s application,

†
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School of Law; B.B.A., 2008, Hofstra University. Special thanks to Professor Adam
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1
See infra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
2
See infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text.
3
See infra notes 68–70 and accompanying text.
4
See infra Part II.B.2–3; see also Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (“In short, the policy embodied by the combatant activities exception is simply
the elimination of tort from the battlefield . . . .”).
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however, reveals that it extends immunity to a far broader range
of activities than those involving the use of force against the
enemy.
Promulgated by the District of Columbia Circuit’s 2009
decision in Saleh v. Titan Corp.,5 the interpretation of the
combatant activities exception as a tool to eliminate tort liability
from the battlefield has led to a standard that runs contrary not
only to Supreme Court precedent, but also to basic concepts of
fairness. In Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York applied this interpretation of the exception to a lawsuit
brought by a private contractor employed by the United States
government.6 The plaintiff was injured when he fell in a
bathroom on a forward operating base that was negligently
maintained by the defendant.7 The court applied the combatant
activities exception and denied the plaintiff the chance to recover
for his injuries.8
Essentially, the court believed that the
maintenance of a bathroom was a combatant activity for the
purpose of this exception because the bathroom was located on
what it considered a battlefield.9
That a lawsuit arising out of activity which is so far from the
common understanding of combat could be preempted by the
combatant activities exception simply because it occurred on a
battlefield inexorably raises questions about what other types of
actions would be similarly barred. What, for example, of the
claims brought by Jamie Leigh Jones, who in 2004 was brutally
sexually assaulted in the “Green Zone” of Baghdad at an
installation owned by Halliburton?10
Ms. Jones’s repeated
complaints of sexual harassment and requests for the all-female
housing that she claimed was promised in her contract were
ignored by Halliburton before she was beaten and gang raped by
several Halliburton employees in her barracks bedroom.11 Her
claims could likewise be preempted by the combatant activities
exception under this interpretation. It does not make sense that
Ms. Jones and other similarly injured women could be denied
5

580 F.3d 1.
751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 710–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
7
Id. at 700.
8
Id. at 715.
9
Id. at 713–14.
10
See Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 231–32 (5th Cir. 2009).
11
Id. at 231.
6
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relief by a statute designed to shield the government from
liability resulting from military action simply because they were
injured on or near a battlefield.
Further equitable concerns surrounding this interpretation
of the exception arise when considering the countless civilians
whose hometowns and villages have become warzones.12 Under
this approach, these civilians would be unable to bring civil
actions for grossly negligent or even malicious conduct of
American troops or private contractors simply because an
impersonal foreign power determined that it was necessary to
conduct combat operations steps away from their homes.
A second interpretation of the exception exists that takes
some of these equitable concerns into account. The Ninth
Circuit, in deciding Koohi v. United States,13 promulgated an
interpretation of the combatant activities exception that is more
narrowly tailored to accomplishing the statute’s goals.
Essentially, the Ninth Circuit interprets the exception as
applying only to activities that involve the direction of hostile
force.14 In Koohi, for example, the tracking and engagement of a
civilian aircraft mistaken for an enemy warplane was preempted
by the exception.15 This is the type of activity, as opposed to
bathroom maintenance, which one would logically assume would
be preempted by the combatant activities exception in light of its
wording and apparent intent. It is unlikely that under this
interpretation a suit for something like a slip and fall in a
bathroom would be barred. Under this interpretation, the
application of the exception seems to turn on whether or not the
activity involved actual combat, rather than the activity’s
location relative to combat.
The Ninth Circuit’s approach is not without flaws, however.
Developed in the context of a conflict which is very different from
those in which the United States is currently engaged,16 this
interpretation is simultaneously too broad and too narrow. It is
too broad because unlike the conflict surrounding Koohi, current
battlefields are often densely populated urban areas.17 Providing
12
See Sabrina Tavernise & Andrew W. Lehren, Buffeted by Fury and Chaos,
Civilians Paid Heaviest Toll, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at A1.
13
976 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1992).
14
Id. at 1335.
15
Id. at 1337.
16
See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
17
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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a broad shield from liability for the direction of hostile force
becomes less reasonable as the risk that that hostile force will
harm noncombatants increases. At the same time, the approach
is too narrow because it may open the government to liability for
activities that do not involve the direction of hostile force but to
which strong policy considerations nonetheless favor the
extension of immunity.
Under both circuits’ interpretations, the government may be
shielded from liability for injuries resulting from activities that
could have been more safely performed without compromising
national defense. This Note takes the position that in light of the
inadequacies of both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits’ interpretations
of the combatant activities exception, a new approach is needed
that will strike an appropriate balance between the government’s
interest in defending the nation unencumbered by the threat of
tort liability and the rights of injured parties to recover.
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the Federal
Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) and discusses the Supreme Court’s
prevailing approach to interpreting the Act’s various exceptions.
The Supreme Court’s approach to interpreting the congressional
intent of these exceptions, which is based on giving effect to the
plainest meaning of their language, lends invaluable insight into
how the combatant activities exception should be applied. Part II
examines the combatant activities exception itself, introducing
its component parts and discussing in greater detail the abovereferenced circuit split concerning its interpretation. While there
is a consensus as to the actors covered by the exception and the
general circumstances under which it may apply, the circuits
disagree on what types of activities are covered.
Part III provides an overview of the problems inherent to
each circuit’s understanding of what activities are covered by the
exception. Part IV, in light of these problems, proposes a solution
which more adequately addresses the policy concerns attached to
the exception. These policy concerns, along with Supreme Court
precedent and basic principles of equity, counsel strongly against
the continued use of either approach. The proposed approach
discussed in this Part will take all of these considerations into
account.
The proposed solution is a two-part test. It looks first, as the
Supreme Court would, to the plain meaning of the exception’s
language, and asks if the activity in question constitutes combat
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as it is commonly understood. An affirmative answer will give
rise to a rebuttable presumption that the exception applies,
thereby protecting the government’s interest. However, the
injured party will retain a chance to recover if he or she can
present evidence that the complained-of activity violated the
rules of engagement for the area in which it occurred.18 If the
activity in question does not conform to common understandings
of combat, a presumption will arise that the combatant activities
exception does not apply, protecting injured parties’ interests in
recovery. However, this presumption, too, can be rebutted if the
government can show that the activity is similar enough to
combat that imposing liability for it would give rise to the same
policy concerns as would imposing liability for combat. To do
this, the government would provide evidence based on the nature
of the act in question and the physical and temporal proximity of
the activity to actual combat.
Lastly, Part V illustrates how this new standard would be
applied to a variety of scenarios like those mentioned above, and
in doing so will address the major criticisms that are likely to
arise. Starting with the facts of Aiello and moving into those
surrounding Ms. Jones’s injuries, this Part will show how this
new standard will provide more equitable results to activities
that are clearly not combat, while preserving the government’s
immunity in those cases where non-combat activities implicate
the same policy concerns as actual combat. Transitioning into
injuries likely to result from the encroachment of warzones into
densely populated urban areas, this Part will next discuss the
benefits of this new approach to activities which are combat, but
where non-combatants are injured.
I.

HISTORY OF THE COMBATANT ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION

This Part examines the process behind determining what
kind of liability the government did or did not assume with the
FTCA. In order to define “combatant activities” for the purposes
of this exception, an examination of the history of the Federal
Tort Claims Act and some of its exceptions is necessary. To
determine what kind of liability the government never intended
to assume, and therefore, what type of activities should not give
18
This Note does not, of course, suggest that enemy combatants should be able
to seek relief in U.S. courts for injuries suffered as a result of U.S. military activity.
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rise to liability under the FTCA, it is instructive to examine the
process of determining what type of liability the government did
intend to assume.
A.

History of the Federal Tort Claims Act

The Federal Tort Claims Act is a qualified waiver of the
sovereign immunity of the United States government with
respect to civil actions.19 Enacted into law by Congress in 1948,
the FTCA provides jurisdiction to the district courts over civil
actions against the federal government, permitting claimants to
seek judicial, rather than legislative, relief.20 Prior to the
enactment of the FTCA, anyone seeking to press claims against
the federal government for injuries to person or property was
forced to introduce a private bill in Congress.21 These bills would
go then to the Committee on Claims for consideration.22
Not surprisingly, the Committee eventually became so
inundated with bills that within a given session of Congress it
was able to review only about half of the claims referred to it.23
As a result, many injured parties were forced to wait years for
the merits of their claims to be considered.24 After suffering this
delay, claimants were next confronted by a “rule of unanimous
consent,” by which a proposed bill of relief, having been given due
consideration by a majority of the committee, could be defeated
at the whim of one member, even if barely familiar with the
By 1931, however, Congress realized that this
claim.25
antiquated method of handling tort claims against the federal
government was unjust and unsustainable,26 and it recognized
the need for change.27 It was not until the FTCA was enacted,
however, that a tenable and maintainable method of adjudicating
claims against the federal government was established.

19

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 2013); 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2006).
See id. § 1346(b).
21
71 CONG. REC. 6868 (1931).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
See id.
25
Id.
26
Id. (noting that “[m]any times bad humor and prejudice on the part of some
Member will defeat a worthy and just claim,” and that “with the vast number of bills
referred to [the] committee it is impossible to keep up with [the] work”).
27
See id.
20
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The FTCA is an expression of the federal government’s
willingness to accept liability for injuries caused by the
negligence or wrongful acts of government employees acting
within the scope of their duty.28 Taken together, the terms of the
FTCA open the government to liability as if it were a private
actor, and the remnants of sovereign immunity are preserved
only in a handful of exceptions enumerated in § 2680 of the
United States Code.29
One of these exceptions, aptly dubbed the “combatant
activities exception,” expressly exempts the government from
liability for injuries “arising out of the combatant activities of the
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of
war.”30 This ostensibly straightforward language belies the
complexity of the considerations inherent to the exception’s
creation. A discussion of these considerations, an understanding
of which is crucial to applying the exception appropriately, is
informed by examining some of the Act’s other exceptions.
B.

The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Other Exceptions to the
FTCA

To best infer which activities may properly be considered
“combatant activities,” and therefore exempt from litigation
under the FTCA, it is helpful to look at the process used to
determine what kind of liability the government did or did not
intend to assume. This intention is revealed through other
statutory exceptions to the FTCA.31 Each of these exceptions
manifests an attempt to balance a government interest in
efficient and effective operation within a given field against a
private interest in recovery for injuries resulting from that
operation.32 If the threat of liability would interfere too greatly
with this government interest, then that field of operation would

28

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (West 2013).
See id. §§ 1346(b), 2680.
30
Id. § 2680(j).
31
See id. § 2680.
32
See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 858 (1984) (stating that there are
three objectives most commonly cited in legislative history as rationales for the
exceptions to the FTCA: “ensuring that ‘certain governmental activities’ not be
disrupted by the threat of damage suits; avoiding exposure of the United States to
liability for excessive or fraudulent claims; and not extending the coverage of the Act
to suits for which adequate remedies were already available”).
29
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be exempted from suit by § 2680.33 While some of the exceptions
under § 2680 preempt litigation of claims arising out of
government operation within a discrete, clearly defined field,
others, like the combatant activities exception, require some
degree of interpretation.34
1.

Dolan v. United States Postal Service

The Supreme Court has chosen to narrowly interpret
exceptions to the FTCA, applying them in a manner that best
conforms to a reasonable understanding of the language used.35
In Dolan v. United States Postal Service,36 the Court held that a
suit against the United States Postal Service for injuries
resulting from negligently placed mail was not barred by
§ 2680(b), an exception to the FTCA that covers the “negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter.”37 The plaintiff in that
case, Barbara Dolan, was injured after she tripped and fell over
mail left on her porch by postal employees.38 Dolan brought suit
in United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, claiming that the postal employees’ negligent
placement of the mail had opened the government to liability
under the FTCA.39 The district court dismissed the suit and the
Third Circuit affirmed, with both courts concluding that although

33

See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2680.
Compare § 2680(d) (preempting “[a]ny claim for which a remedy is provided
by chapter 309 or 311 of title 46 relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the
United States”), § 2680(e) (preempting “[a]ny claim arising out of an act or omission
of any employee of the Government in administering the provisions of sections 1–31
of Title 50, Appendix”), § 2680(k) (preempting “[a]ny claim arising in a foreign
country”), § 2680(l) (preempting “[a]ny claim arising from the activities of the
Tennessee Valley Authority”), and § 2680(m) (preempting “[a]ny claim arising from
the activities of the Panama Canal Company”), with § 2680(b) (preempting “[a]ny
claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or
postal matter”), § 2680(i) (preempting “[a]ny claim for damages caused by the fiscal
operations of the Treasury or by the regulation of the monetary system”), and
§ 2680(j) (preempting “[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of the
military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of war”).
35
See Kosak, 465 U.S. at 854 (stating that “the fairest interpretation of the
crucial portion of [§ 2680(c)] is the one that first springs to mind”).
36
546 U.S. 481 (2006).
37
Id. at 488–89; see § 2680(b).
38
Dolan, 546 U.S. at 483.
39
Id.
34
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the FTCA waives sovereign immunity with respect to federal
postal employees’ torts, the claim was barred by § 2680(b).40 The
Supreme Court disagreed.41
The Court declined to read breadth into the exception that
was not expressed by the language Congress used. It concluded
that § 2680(b), which states that the government is not liable for
“[a]ny claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent
transmission of letters or postal matter,”42 was never intended to
apply to suits for injuries that were not “the sort primarily
identified with the Postal Service’s function of transporting mail
throughout the United States.”43 The Court stated that “both
context and precedent require a narrower reading [of § 2680(b)],
so that ‘negligent transmission’ does not go beyond negligence
causing mail to be lost or to arrive late, in damaged condition, or
at the wrong address.”44 The Court felt that if Congress meant to
preserve sovereign immunity for activities other than those most
commonly associated with the Postal Service’s primary function
of delivering mail, it would not have specified those activities as
the only activities to which the exception extends.45
The Court found additional significance in the statute’s
wording beyond its specificity. It was quick to note that “the
words ‘negligent transmission’ in § 2680(b) follow two other
terms, ‘loss’ and ‘miscarriage,’ ”46 and felt that the phrase
“negligent transmission” should be interpreted in light of these
accompanying terms.47 Because “both those terms refer to
failings in the postal obligation to deliver mail,” the Court
reasoned that “it would be odd if ‘negligent transmission’ swept

40

Id.
Id.
42
§ 2680(b).
43
Dolan, 546 U.S. at 489.
44
Id. at 486.
45
See id. at 489–90 (stating that “[o]ther FTCA exceptions paint with a far
broader brush,” and that “[h]ad Congress intended to preserve immunity for all torts
related to postal delivery—torts including hazardous mail placement at customer
homes—it could have used similarly sweeping language”); see also § 2680(b)
(specifying “loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission” as the only sources of
injuries against which the government retains immunity).
46
Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486.
47
Id.
41
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far more broadly to include injuries . . . that happen to be caused
by postal employees but involve neither failure to transmit mail
nor damage to its contents.”48
This was the “context” that the Court referred to as
“requir[ing] a narrower reading [of § 2680(b)].”49
Briefly
combining contextual and precedential analyses, the Court noted
that the established “rule” that “[a] word is known by the
company it keeps . . . is often wisely applied where a word is
capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of
unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.”50 This, however,
was only a cursory glance at precedent by the Court. The Court’s
full analysis of precedent that “require[d] a narrower reading [of
§ 2680(b)],” revolved around Kosak v. United States.51
2.

Kosak v. United States

The Dolan Court’s deference to apparent legislative intent,
reflected by its narrow interpretation of § 2680(b), was premised
in large part on Kosak.52 In Kosak, the Court took a similar
analytical approach to reach a different, but consistent,
conclusion with respect to § 2680(c), finding that the absence of
specific limiting language was a clear expression of congressional
intent that the exception apply more broadly.53
Kosak dealt with a claim against the government brought
under the FTCA by a plaintiff whose property had been seized by
the United States Customs Service.54 Alleging that some of the
property eventually returned to him was damaged by the
government while it was detained, plaintiff sought relief under
the FTCA in the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania.55 The government moved for dismissal of the
48

Id. at 487.
See id. at 486–87; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
50
Dolan, 546 U.S. at 486 (quoting Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303,
307 (1961)).
51
465 U.S. 848 (1984); see Dolan, 546 U.S. at 487 (stating “[o]ur interpretation
would be less secure were it not for a precedent we deem to have decisive weight
here. We refer to Kosak v. United States . . . .”).
52
See id. at 487–88.
53
Kosak, 465 U.S. at 855 (comparing the language of § 2680(b) and § 2680(c)
and noting “[t]he absence of any analogous desire to limit the reach of the statutory
exception pertaining to the detention of property by customs officials . . . in the
phraseology of § 2680(c)”).
54
Id. at 849–50.
55
Id. at 850.
49

FINAL_KUTNER

2013]

2/27/2014 6:30 PM

THE COMBATANT ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION

711

complaint and for summary judgment, arguing that the claim
was barred by § 2680(c).56 The district court granted the
government’s motion, and the court of appeals affirmed.57 The
court of appeals held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for
which relief could be granted because “the ‘clear language’ of
§ 2680(c) shields the United States from ‘all claims arising out of
detention of goods by customs officers and does not purport to
distinguish among types of harm.’ ”58 The Supreme Court
affirmed, finding that the complaint was properly dismissed as
barred by § 2680(c).59
The Court interpreted § 2680(c) in the manner that it felt
most closely reflected the plain meaning of its language.60 At the
time Kosak was decided, § 2680(c), which has since been
amended, exempted from suit under the FTCA “[a]ny claim
arising in respect of . . . the detention of any goods or
merchandise by any officer of customs.”61 The plaintiff argued
that this language only covered claims for damage caused by the
detention itself and not claims for damage inflicted while the
property was in the possession of the Customs Service.62 The
Court disagreed, finding that the phrase “ ‘any claim arising in
respect of’ the detention of goods,” as used in the statute, meant
“any claim ‘arising out of’ the detention of goods,” and included
handling and storing detained property.63
In reaching its decision, the Court juxtaposed the very
general language of § 2680(c) with the specific language of
§ 2680(b), the postal services exception.64 The Court recognized
that the specificity in the postal services exception was not
accidental; it was a product of the fact that one of the primary
56

Id.
Id. at 850–51.
58
Id. at 851 (quoting Kosak v. United States, 679 F.2d 306, 308 (3d Cir. 1982)).
59
Id. at 862.
60
See id. (“The language of [§ 2680(c)] as it was written leaves us no choice but
to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the [FTCA] does not cover suits
alleging that customs officials injured property that had been detained by the
Customs Service.”).
61
Id. at 852 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). The repeated use of the
word “any” in this statute suggests a range of activities and persons covered, which
stands in stark contrast to the specific and limited range of activity and persons
covered by the combatant activities exception. See id. at 853, 855; see also infra note
70 and accompanying text.
62
Kosak, 465 U.S. at 852–53, 862.
63
Id. at 854.
64
Id. at 855.
57
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goals of the FTCA was to waive the government’s immunity
against liability for injuries caused by motor vehicle accidents in
which postal employees were at fault.65 The Court reasoned that
to ensure that § 2680(b) did not bar the exact type of suit that
Congress was concerned about allowing, the exception’s drafters
“carefully delineated the types of misconduct for which the
Government was not assuming financial responsibility—namely,
‘the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters or
postal matter’—thereby excluding, by implication, negligent
handling of motor vehicles.”66 Clearly, the Court felt that had
Congress meant for § 2680(b) to preclude suits for motor vehicle
accidents, the exception would have said so explicitly. Similarly,
had Congress meant to limit the application of § 2680(c) to
damage to property caused by detention itself, it would have used
limiting language instead of the broad sweeping terms it chose.
II. THE COMBATANT ACTIVITIES EXCEPTION
The combatant activities exception to the FTCA is designed
to reflect the policy that the government should not be liable for
injuries resulting from action taken by the armed forces in
defense of the nation.67 Seemingly an extension of the doctrine of
salus populi,68 the combatant activities exception is best
understood as reflecting the principle that the interests of an
injured few in recovering damages are outweighed by the
interests of the United States in engaging enemies in combat
unhindered by the threat of civil liability.69 The statute makes a
very plain statement to this effect: “The provisions of . . . [the
65

Id.
Id.
67
Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1334 (9th Cir. 1992).
68
Salus populi suprema lex esto is a legal maxim that means “let the welfare of
the people be the supreme law.” Salus Populi Suprema Lex Esto, MERRIAMWEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/salus%20populi%20suprema
%20lex%20esto (last visited Jan. 15, 2014).
69
See, e.g., Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334–35 (“Congress certainly did not want our
military personnel to exercise great caution at a time when bold and imaginative
measures might be necessary to overcome enemy forces; nor did it want our
soldiers . . . to be concerned about the possibility of tort liability when making life or
death decisions in the midst of combat.”); Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C.
Cir. 2009) (“The legislative history of the combatant activities exception is
‘singularly barren,’ but it is plain enough that Congress sought to exempt combatant
activities because such activities ‘by their very nature should be free from the
hindrance of a possible damage suit.’ ” (quoting Johnson v. United States, 170 F.2d
767, 769 (9th Cir. 1948))).
66
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FTCA] shall not apply to . . . [a]ny claim arising out of the
combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast
Guard, during time of war.”70
Viewed in light of this principle and the Supreme Court’s
narrow interpretation of some of the FTCA’s other exceptions,
the combatant activities exception can most sensibly be
understood as preserving sovereign immunity against claims
arising out of military combat.71 As discussed above, that this
conclusion seems obvious serves only to reinforce that it is
correct.72 An examination of the exception’s history, however,
reveals that this understanding is far from universal.
There appears to be a general consensus as to the actors
covered by the exception and the context in which an act must
occur to be covered; but there is significant disharmony regarding
what types of activities constitute “combatant activities” and
therefore fall under the exception. Turning first to the agreedupon elements, it is widely accepted that in addition to uniform
members of the United States armed forces, the combatant
activities exception also shields private contractors from
liability.73 Likewise, the exception is generally understood to
apply to military activities even absent a formal declaration of
war.74
A.

To Whom and When Does the Exception Apply?

The Ninth and D.C. Circuits have used the combatant
activities exception to the FTCA to shield both uniform soldiers
and private contractors from liability.75 Both courts share an
understanding that the policies behind the combatant activities
exception are the same whether the party responsible for an
injury is a soldier or a private contractor.76 Accordingly, both
70

28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2006).
See supra Parts I.B.1–2.
72
See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
73
See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9; Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1337.
74
See Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1335.
75
See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9 (“During wartime, where a private service contractor
is integrated into combatant activities over which the military retains command
authority, a tort claim arising out of the contractor’s engagement in such activities
shall be preempted.”); Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1336–37 (holding that plaintiffs’ action
against the private manufacturers of an Aegis Air Defense System deployed by the
United States Navy and used to shoot down a civilian airliner was preempted by the
combatant activities exception).
76
See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 8; Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1337.
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courts seem to agree that the imposition of liability on
contractors for injuries caused in combat would interfere with the
same interests that the imposition of liability on soldiers would.77
Therefore, in situations where the combatant activities exception
would bar claims against the government, it preempts claims
against government contractors.78
Similar policy-based reasoning serves as the foundation for
the consensus among these courts that a formal declaration of
war is not a prerequisite for applying the combatant activities
exception.79 Just as those policy concerns are equally implicated
whether the actor is a uniformed soldier or private contractor,
they are also equally implicated “[w]hether that combat is
formally authorized by the Congress or follows less formal
actions of the Executive and Legislative branches.”80 Indeed,
both the Ninth and D.C. Circuits have applied the exception to
shield the government and private contractors from liability for
injuries arising out of combat in the absence of a congressional
declaration of war.81
B.

“Combatant Activities”

Whatever uniformity may result from this common
understanding of the actors and circumstances covered by the
exception is threatened by a potentially decisive split between
the Ninth and D.C. Circuits as to what actual activity is covered.
The two courts have taken very different approaches to
interpreting the term “combatant activities.” On the one hand,
the Ninth Circuit’s approach can best be understood as
precluding only claims for injuries arising out of what is most
commonly understood as combat—“hostile encounters” with the
enemy.82 It is therefore not only well in line with the Supreme
Court’s approach to interpreting FTCA exceptions, but it also
accounts for the exception’s foundational policy concern.83

77

See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 8; Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1337.
See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 9; Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1337.
79
See Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1334.
80
See id.
81
See id. at 1333. The Saleh court seemed to assume that a declaration of war
was not necessary to apply the exception, as the subject was not discussed in the
case.
82
Id. at 1335.
83
See supra notes 35, 69 and accompanying text.
78
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On the other hand is the D.C. Circuit’s approach, which far
more broadly interprets the exception as applying in such a way
as to “eliminat[e] tort concepts from the battlefield.”84 While this
approach does reflect the exception’s policy considerations, it
seems to depart from Supreme Court precedent by reading
unintended breadth into the statute.85 The difference between
these two interpretations, which at first glance may seem merely
semantic, is actually quite decisive. An examination of the cases
in which these respective approaches were promulgated and
contrasted for subsequent application palpably highlights just
how consequential the difference is.
1.

Koohi v. United States

In Koohi v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that the
combatant activities exception barred claims against the
government and private contractors brought by the families of
passengers and crew members of an Iranian airliner shot down
by a United States warship.86 The warship, the USS Vincennes,
was a naval cruiser equipped with an Aegis Air Defense System
manufactured by defendant contractors.87
As part of the
American effort to protect ships carrying Iraqi cargo during the
Iran-Iraq war, United States naval forces began engaging
Iranian naval vessels in combat.88 In the midst of this ongoing
conflict, the USS Vincennes dispatched a helicopter to investigate
reports of activity by Iranian gunboats.89 When the helicopter
reported that it had taken antiaircraft fire, the Vincennes crossed
into Iranian waters and engaged the enemy gunboats.90 Minutes
later, an Iranian civilian airliner departed from a “joint
commercial-military airport” in Iran.91 “The Vincennes was in
the vicinity of the aircraft’s flight path” and mistook it for an

84

Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
See supra Part I.B.
86
Koohi, 976 F.2d at 1330, 1333.
87
Id. at 1330.
88
Id. (citing multiple “publicized incidents” in which Iranian and United States
naval forces clashed, resulting in casualties and extensive damage to property on
both sides).
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Id.
85
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Iranian military jet.92 Using the Aegis Air Defense System, the
crew of the Vincennes targeted the airliner and shot it down over
the Persian Gulf, killing all 290 people aboard.93
Plaintiffs brought suit against the United States government
and the various manufacturers of the Aegis Air Defense System,
alleging that negligent operation of the Vincennes and design
defects in the air defense system led to misidentification of the
airliner and the decision to fire on it.94 While the court
recognized that the incident was tragic, it nevertheless held that
the action was barred by the combatant activities exception.95
The action taken by the Vincennes was found to constitute
combatant activity because it involved the direction of hostile
action towards what was perceived as an enemy.96 Although the
court did not go so far as to define combatant activity as
necessarily involving hostile action or conduct directly connected
to it, its repeated association of the combatant activities
exception with acts of hostility leads to this conclusion.97 This
conclusion is also consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s
understanding that the policy behind the combatant activities
exception “is to ensure that the government will not be liable for
negligent conduct by our armed forces in times of combat.”98
Understanding the exception to be limited to hostile
engagements or conduct directly connected to them is fairly well
in keeping with Supreme Court precedent. As discussed above,
the Supreme Court narrowly interprets exceptions to the FTCA,
using the most reasonable understanding of the exception’s
92

Id.
Id.
94
Id. at 1330–31.
95
Id. at 1335–36.
96
Id. at 1337.
97
Id. at 1335 (noting that “tort law, in toto, is an inappropriate subject for
injection into the area of military engagements. The FTCA clearly recognizes this
principle . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. (stating the FTCA applies “when . . . United
States armed forces engage in an organized series of hostile encounters on a
significant scale” (emphasis added)); id. at 1335–36 (noting that for purposes of the
exemption from the FTCA, “it is of no significance whether a plane that is shot down
is civilian or military, so long as the person giving the order or firing the weapon
does so for the purpose of furthering our military objectives or of defending lives,
property, or other interests” (emphasis added)); id. at 1337 (stating that “one
purpose of the combatant activities exception is to recognize that during wartime
encounters no duty of reasonable care is owed to those against whom force is directed
as a result of authorized military action” (emphasis added)).
98
Id. at 1334.
93
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language.99 Interpreting the combatant activities exception using
the same methods employed by the Supreme Court, it seems
likely that Congress meant to exempt from the FTCA only
military activity involving or necessary to hostile action.
Had Congress intended to exempt a broader range of
activity, as some courts argue, it could simply have left out the
descriptive word “combatant” in the exception.100 If, as the
Supreme Court suggested in Kosak v. United States, “the fairest
interpretation of the crucial portion of [an exception to the FTCA]
is the one that first springs to mind,” then “combatant activities”
should be interpreted as requiring hostile action.101 However, the
D.C. Circuit opened the door for a much broader interpretation.
2.

Saleh v. Titan Corp.

In Saleh v. Titan Corp., the D.C. Circuit held that the
combatant activities exception preempted claims brought by
Iraqi nationals against private military contractors used by the
United States government for interrogation and interpretation
services.102 The plaintiffs claim that they were subjected to abuse
by the defendants while held at the Abu Ghraib military prison
in Iraq.103 The court, relying on its understanding that “all of the
traditional rationales for tort law—deterrence of risk-taking
behavior, compensation of victims, and punishment of
tortfeasors—are singularly out of place in combat situations,
where risk-taking is the rule,”104 concluded that “the policy
embodied by the combatant activities exception is simply the
elimination of tort from the battlefield.”105
99

See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
See generally Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d
698 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Congress could certainly have drafted or modified the exception
to say, “The provisions of . . . [the FTCA] shall not apply to any claims arising out of
the activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during a time of
war.”
101
Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 854 (1984). The first interpretation of
“combatant activities” that comes to mind, especially when viewed in light of the
accompanying terms, is a hostile military engagement. It is not a great stretch to say
that the interpretation of “combatant activities” that “first springs to mind” would
include the tracking, targeting, and engaging of what was legitimately perceived as
a hostile aircraft.
102
Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 2, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
103
Id. at 2.
104
Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted) (citing Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328,
1334–35 (9th Cir. 1992)).
105
Id.
100
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Because the imposition of tort liability would necessarily
conflict with “the FTCA’s policy of eliminating tort concepts from
the battlefield,” the court determined that this case presented it
with a form of general conflict preemption.106 Coining the term
“battle-field preemption,” the court announced that “the federal
government occupies the field when it comes to warfare, and its
interest in combat is always ‘precisely contrary’ to the imposition
of a non-federal tort duty.”107 It would not be long before this
broad-sweeping concept was taken to its logical conclusion.
3.

Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc.

In Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc., the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that the combatant activities exception preempted claims
brought by a civilian contractor who was injured when he fell in a
bathroom within Camp Shield, a forward operating base in
Iraq.108 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, a private service
contractor retained by the government to provide support
services at Camp Shield, was negligent in its construction and
maintenance of the latrine facility.109 The Southern District
granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, finding
that the maintenance of the latrine facility fell into the category
of “combatant activity.”110 Applying the doctrine promulgated by
the D.C. Circuit in Saleh v. Titan Corp., this decision highlights
the dramatic difference between the Ninth and D.C. Circuits’
interpretations of combatant activities.111
The court found that the Ninth Circuit’s approach of
“remov[ing] the duty of care only as to ‘those against whom force
is directed’ [was] unduly narrow.”112 It reasoned that the Koohi
standard, “which limits the [government] interest to precluding
106

Id.
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500,
500 (1988)).
108
751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 715.
111
Id. at 709–10. Beyond the outcome of the case, which itself exemplifies the
substantial differences between the two approaches, the court remarked that “the
differences between these formulations are significant,” and that if the Koohi
standard were applied, there would be no conflict in this case and therefore no
preemption. See id. at 709.
112
Id. at 709 (quoting Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1337 (9th Cir.
1992)).
107
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suits brought by those against whom force is directed,” would not
serve the policies underlying the exception.113 The court instead
adopted the D.C. Circuit’s formulation and stated that “the
combatant activity exception creates a type of field
preemption[;] . . . [i]t is not necessary to determine whether
military judgments would necessarily be examined . . . because
any claim arising out of combatant activities is preempted.”114 In
keeping with this understanding that there is no room on the
battlefield for tort liability, regardless of whether military
judgment is implicated in a decision which caused injury, the
court determined that for the purposes of this exception, the
maintenance of a bathroom was a combatant activity.115 This
conclusion seems to clash with both Supreme Court precedent
and the purpose of the combatant activities exception.
It is difficult to imagine that the Supreme Court, in light of
its narrow treatment of other exceptions to the FTCA, would
apply the combatant activities exception to the maintenance of a
bathroom absent some extenuating circumstances. It is true, as
the Aiello court noted, “that the creation and maintenance of
these necessary facilities is integral to sustaining combat
operations.”116 But is latrine maintenance any more integral to
sustaining combat operations than is the use of motor vehicles by
the Postal Service to the delivery of mail? The Supreme Court
has clearly stated that negligent operation of postal vehicles,
though necessary for the postal service to perform its primary
function, is not exempt from suit under the “Postal Service
Exception.”117 That an activity is necessary to combat, it would
appear, should not be enough to bring that activity under the
ambit of the combatant activities exception.
Even assuming that the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the
combatant activities exception is too narrow, and that the
direction of hostility is not a prerequisite for its application, it
can hardly be said that the most reasonable interpretation of the
exception’s plain language would necessarily extend immunity to
113

Id. at 710.
Id. at 710–11.
115
Id. at 713.
116
Id. at 714.
117
Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848, 855 (1984). On the contrary, the Kosak
Court noted that “[o]ne of the principal purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act was
to waive the Government’s immunity from liability for injuries resulting from auto
accidents in which employees of the Postal System were at fault.” Id.
114
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latrine maintenance simply because of location. Applying the
same methods that the Supreme Court has, it becomes clear that
this area is simply too far removed from the most likely intent of
Congress in drafting the combatant activities exception.
III. A NEW STANDARD IS NEEDED
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of “combatant activities”
is closer to the plain text of the statute than the D.C. Circuit’s.
Instead of including any activity that occurs on a battlefield, it
only includes the direction of hostile force or other activity that is
immediately connected thereto, such as the tracking and
targeting of the enemy aircraft in Koohi.118 It is sensible to say
that it becomes less likely that the government intended to
assume liability for an activity the closer that activity is to
engaging an enemy.
When Koohi was decided, however, the nature of wars being
fought by the United States was very different than it is today.119
As enemies become increasingly difficult to discern from
civilians, and warzones become increasingly urbanized, it
becomes more likely that the U.S. military will injure
noncombatants while directing force at the enemy.120 Therefore,
the “blanket” protection of hostile action afforded by the Koohi
standard may be inappropriate.
At the same time, the same policy concerns underlying the
exception still favor ensuring that military decision-makers, at
whatever level, are not so concerned with incurring liability that
they refrain from acting in defense of the nation. While the D.C.
Circuit’s standard clearly accounts for these concerns, its
continued application will lead to more inequitable results like
that seen in Aiello. Simply precluding any action for injuries
that occurred on a battlefield, regardless of their cause, gives the
government too much immunity at the expense of injured parties.
A better balance must be struck between the conflicting interests
of the government in defending the nation free from the threat of

118

See Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1333–36 (9th Cir. 1992).
The conflict surrounding Koohi involved the United States conducting naval
combat operations against Iranian military forces in a clearly-defined, recognizable,
and relatively uninhabited combat zone. See id. at 1329–30, 1337. The current war
in Iraq, on the other hand, involves combat operations in populated cities against
ununiformed insurgents. See Tavernise & Lehern, supra note 12.
120
See Tavernise & Lehern, supra note 12.
119
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liability, and those of parties injured as a result of activity that
cannot rightly be considered combat, but nevertheless may
currently be precluded from suit by the combatant activities
exception.
IV. A NEW STANDARD
This Note proposes that a possible solution to this dilemma
lies in a two-step process that will account for the government’s
interest in preserving its immunity for activities necessary to
national defense as well as the interests of injured parties. The
first step is to ask whether or not the activity that gave rise to
the injury was clearly combatant, as the word is most commonly
understood. In other words, the question becomes: “Did the
injury arise from the direction of hostile force?” Step two
depends on the answer to that question. If the answer is no, a
rebuttable presumption arises that the combatant activities
exception does not apply.121 If the answer is yes, a rebuttable
presumption arises that it does.
A.

Step One—Is the Activity Clearly “Combatant?”

Step one begins essentially with an application of the Ninth
Circuit’s standard: The court must determine if the activity that
gave rise to the injury is one that would be considered combat as
it is commonly understood.122 This reflects both the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of other exceptions to the FTCA and the
policy concerns behind the combatant activities exception.
If the activity was clearly not combative, a rebuttable
presumption arises that the combatant activities exception does
not apply. To overcome this, the government will have to show
that the activity, although it was not the direction of force or
connected immediately to the direction of force, was so like
combat that it implicates the same policy concerns that serve as
the foundation for the combatant activities exception. In other
words, the government will have to show that the threat of
imposing tort liability for this activity would cause hesitation to
121
It should be noted that the inapplicability of the combatant activities
exception does not necessarily mean that the government will be liable for the
injury. There are other exceptions to the FTCA, such as the discretionary function
exception and foreign country exception, which may still bar the suit. See
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a), (k) (2006).
122
See supra Part II.B.1.

FINAL_KUTNER

722

2/27/2014 6:30 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:701

act that would be detrimental to national defense. This showing
should be based on three criteria: the nature of the act
performed, the physical proximity of the act to combat, and the
temporal proximity of the act to combat.
The nature of the activity and its physical and temporal
proximity to combat are logical considerations when determining
whether an act, though not actually combat, is similar enough to
combat that it raises the same policy concerns. An examination
of the nature of the activity should focus on how necessary it is to
combat. The more necessary an activity is to combat, the higher
the risk becomes that imposing liability on it would harm
national security interests. Similarly, the closer an activity
occurs to combat, in terms of both physical space and time, the
more likely it becomes that it would implicate the same concerns
as combat.
The physical proximity consideration should
therefore be based, quite simply, on how near or far from a
combat zone the activity occurred. As for the temporal proximity
consideration, any bright line rule based on the time elapsed
since the last shot was fired would obviously be inappropriate.
Therefore, this consideration should be based on whether the
activity was performed so long after hostilities had ceased that,
depending on the activity, neither additional deliberation nor
earlier action would reasonably have threatened military
interests. Taken together, these three considerations provide a
lens through which to view the overlap, if any, of the policy
concerns behind the combatant activities exception and those
raised by a given non-combat military activity.
B.

Step 2—Applying the Rules of Engagement

If the activity in question is clearly combat, a rebuttable
presumption arises in favor of the government that the
combatant activities exception applies.
To overcome this
presumption, the plaintiff will have to show that the activity
which gave rise to the injury violated the rules of engagement for
the field in which the injury occurred. The rules of engagement
are statements issued by the United States military that govern
when force can be used by military personnel outside of the
United States.123 They are designed to “provide guidance from
123
See CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, CJCSI 3710.01B, DOD
COUNTERDRUG SUPPORT A-17, GL-5 (2007).
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the President and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF), as well as
subordinate commanders, to deployed units on the use of force.”124
They are mission-specific and are intended to be promulgated to
each individual soldier and commander.125
Because soldiers should always be operating within the rules
of engagement, imposing tort liability for a clear violation of
them will not cause the chilling effect on life-or-death decisionmaking that the courts have feared.126 Deployed units will not
have to take any precautions to avoid tort liability beyond those
they must already take upon entering a combat zone. If the
injury arose as a result of the direction of force that was
sanctioned by the rules of engagement, which any force used
should have, the combatant activities exception will apply.
V.

HYPOTHETICAL APPLICATION OF THE TWO-PART TEST TO
VARIOUS FACT PATTERNS

Applying this two-part test to sample fact patterns reveals
that it prevents some injured parties’ claims from being denied
by a tool never intended to be put to that use, while at the same
time protects the government’s interest in engaging hostile forces
free from the threat of liability. Critics of this approach will
likely argue foremost that opening the government to liability for
combat-related injuries at all will compromise the military’s
ability to perform its most essential function. However, under
this test the government is only liable for combat-related injuries
when that combat violates the rules of engagement, which gives
the military a considerably wide berth in waging war. Further, it
is not at all anomalous to Supreme Court jurisprudence that the
government may be held liable when its agents depart from a
governmentally prescribed course of action.127

124
See INT’L & OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL’S
LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK 73 (2010) [hereinafter
OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK].
125
Id. at 80–81.
126
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
127
See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988) (“Thus, the
discretionary function exception [to the FTCA] will not apply when a federal statute,
regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to
follow. In this event, the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the
directive.”).
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Application to Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services, Inc.

Applying this new standard to the Aiello case illustrates its
advantages over either of the inflexible existing standards
discussed in this Note. The Ninth Circuit’s approach would
immediately preclude the application of the exception in a case
like Aiello because the complained-of activity, negligent
maintenance of a bathroom, did not involve the direction of
hostile force.128 On the other hand, under the D.C. Circuit’s
approach the exception would immediately be applied because
the activity occurred on what was considered a battlefield. The
approach proposed by this Note considers additional factors that
allow it to account for the unique circumstances of a given case
that can inform a decision to assign liability.
Even in a case like Aiello, which did not involve combat, an
argument can be made that the combatant activities exception
should apply. Because such a case clearly does not arise out of
combat as it is commonly understood, under the proposed
approach, a presumption arises that the combatant activities
exception does not apply. To maintain immunity under this
exception, the government must show that the activity in
question implicates the same policy concerns as combat itself.
This showing should be based on the nature of the act and its
physical and temporal proximity to combat.
Turning first to the nature of the activity in Aiello, it must be
noted that bathroom maintenance is essential to combat
activity.129 That activity may then be an appropriate basis for
applying the exception if the government can show that, based on
its physical and temporal proximity to combat, imposing liability
would run contrary to national security interests. As for the
physical proximity of the bathroom to combat, it was located on a
forward operating base about three miles outside of the “Green
Zone” in Baghdad, Iraq.130 This base served as “ ‘a refit, rearming point, and a living area’ for U.S. and coalition military
forces.”131 Significantly, the base had come under attack by
hostile forces “[a]round Easter 2008,”132 so an argument could be
128
See Aiello v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 700
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
129
Id. at 713–14.
130
Id. at 701.
131
Id. (citation omitted).
132
Id.
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made that the base itself was a combat zone, or at least
physically close enough to one, so that imposing tort liability for
government action there could implicate some of the policy
concerns embodied in the combatant activities exception. Even
giving the government contractor the benefit of this doubt,
however, the combatant activities exception should not be used to
bar this action.
Application of the combatant activities exception in this case
would be foreclosed under this proposed approach because of the
temporal disconnection of the involved negligence to combat. The
amount of time that elapsed between the last hostilities at the
base and the plaintiff’s injuries was simply too great to say that
earlier action would have imperiled military interests. The facts
of the case suggest that the last hostile action to cause any sort of
danger on the base occurred towards the end of March 2008.133
The plaintiff was injured “on or about May 18, 2008” when
he fell in a bathroom on the base.134 For over a month the
defendant contractor had the opportunity to repair what were
allegedly obvious, dangerous defects in the bathroom.135
Certainly, failing to repair these defects within the hours, or even
days, immediately following an attack could be excused because
of the elevated risk to maintenance personnel. However, as the
amount of time since the last hostile exchange increased, the risk
to such personnel must have started to be outweighed by the
interests in the efficient operation of the base. Surely the base
was not so paralyzed for an entire month by the threat of another
attack that all basic support functions ceased.
Contractors who knowingly enter combat zones should not be
excused by the combatant activities exception for failing to act to
remedy obvious dangers to military personnel when presented
with such a long period of relatively low risk. Even if an activity
is essential to combat and takes place in a combat zone, it cannot
be said that it raises the same policy concerns as actual combat if
the actor is not under the same kind of duress as actual
combatants.
A month-long, unexcused disregard of unsafe
133
See id. (stating that “[a]round Easter 2008, [the base] was subject to three
incidents of mortar and rocket attacks,” and not indicating other attacks on the
base); see also Easter 2008 Is the Earliest in Nearly a Century, TIMEANDDATE.COM
(Mar. 14, 2008), http://www.timeanddate.com/news/holidays/early-easter-2008.html
(stating that in 2008, Easter fell on March 23).
134
Aiello, 751 F. Supp. 2d at 701.
135
See id.
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conditions in a restroom simply does not involve the kind of lifeor-death, instantaneous decision-making that the combatant
activities exception was designed to protect.
As highlighted by its application to the facts of the Aiello
case, the advantage of this proposed approach over the Ninth and
D.C. Circuits’ current approaches lies in its flexibility. This
approach considers factors beyond the location of the activity or
whether it involved the direction of force. Therefore, it would
enable the combatant activities exception to be applied in a
manner more in line with both Supreme Court precedent and
fundamental concepts of fairness without exposing the
government to undue liability.
This advantage is further
underscored by an application of the approach to Jamie Leigh
Jones’s case.
B.

Application to Jamie Leigh Jones’s Injuries

Jamie Leigh Jones was a clerical worker for a company
called Overseas Administrative Services, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Halliburton/KBR.136 Her employment placed her in
the United States Army’s Central Command Area of Operations,
which was located in an area of Baghdad known as the “Green
Zone.”137 Almost immediately upon arriving in Iraq, Ms. Jones
was subjected to sexual harassment.138 Making matters worse,
she was not provided with the private, female-only housing she
claims she was promised in her contract; instead, she was housed
in a barracks shared with other, mostly male, employees.139 Her
complaints of sexual harassment were crassly ignored by
Halliburton/KBR management.140 On the evening of her third
day in Iraq, Ms. Jones “was drugged, beaten, and gang-raped by
several Halliburton/KBR employees in her barracks bedroom.”141
Although Ms. Jones’s eventual case was not decided based on
application of the combatant activities exception, after Aiello it
seems possible that a similar case might barred if brought today
in a jurisdiction applying the D.C. Circuit’s interpretation.142
136

Jones v. Halliburton Co., 583 F.3d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 2009).
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
It should be noted that even the Aiello court discussed the importance of the
fact that the activity at issue in that case was necessary to combat. See Aiello v.
137
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Given the obvious lack of combat in this scenario, it is clear
that under the Ninth Circuit’s standard the combatant activities
exception would not bar Ms. Jones’s claims; however given the
location of Ms. Jones’s attack, one wonders whether the D.C.
Circuit’s standard might. Although the “Green Zone” is not itself
a combat zone,143 is it far enough removed from combat
operations that the D.C. Circuit’s approach would not bar Ms.
Jones’s claim? What if a similar incident happened outside of the
“Green Zone,” in an area like the forward operating base in
Aiello? It is highly doubtful that the drafters of the combatant
activities exception ever meant for it to apply in such scenario,
but that outcome is not entirely unlikely given the D.C. Circuit’s
understanding that the policy behind the exception is to
“eliminat[e] . . . tort from the battlefield.”144
The solution
proposed in this Note would help to ensure that the combatant
activities exception is not applied to claims brought by
individuals situated similarly to Ms. Jones.
Because Ms. Jones’s claims against the government arose
out of activity that was clearly not combat, under the proposed
solution a presumption would arise that the exception does not
apply. To rebut this presumption, the government would have to
show that the activity in question raised the same policy
concerns as combat. Using the three proposed criteria, the
government contractor would understandably be unable to make
this showing with respect to the sexual assault committed by its
employees.
Looking first at the nature of the activity in question, it goes
without saying that sexual assault on an administrative
contractor employee is not essential to combat. This criterion
therefore presents a high hurdle for the government contractor to
overcome. It would be very difficult for the contractor to show
that such an activity, nonessential to combat, raises the same
policy concerns that combat does. Even if a sexual assault were
Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 698, 711–12 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
However, if courts were to strictly apply the exception in such a way as to
“eliminat[e] . . . tort from the battlefield,” as the D.C. Circuit has suggested, claims
for sexual assault may be barred. See Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir.
2009).
143
See Liz Sly, Goodbye to Baghdad’s Inner Sanctum; U.S. Hands Control of the
Green Zone to Iraq. Inside Is a Haven; Outside, Resentment, L.A. TIMES, June 2,
2010, at A3.
144
See Saleh, 580 F.3d at 7.
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to somehow occur in a combat zone during a hostile exchange, it
is so unrelated to combat that there is no way it could rationally
be considered as implicating the same policy concerns that
combat raises. There would be no harm to national security
interests in imposing liability on contractors for sexual assaults
carried out by their employees.
The combatant activities
exception would therefore necessarily bar these kinds of claims
under this proposed solution. On the other end of the spectrum
of this proposed approach are activities that the exception would
almost certainly bar, just as either of the existing approaches
would.
C.

Application to Non-Combatants in Combat Zones

A discussion of this proposed solution would be incomplete
without an application to a scenario involving non-combatants
injured by the direction of hostile force. Such a scenario will
likely give rise to the sternest criticism of the approach. Critics
would rightly be concerned about the policy implications of any
approach that potentially opens the government to more liability
than existing standards for conduct involving the use of force. As
this section shows, however, these concerns are largely
unfounded.
This approach recognizes the pressing government interest
in allowing U.S. military forces to wage war free from irrational
constraint, while waiving immunity only for violations of those
constraints already imposed by the government itself. Using this
approach, immunity for actions taken in combat would be
retained unless the action was a clear violation of the rules of
engagement in that particular combat zone. This has the effect
of allowing non-combatants to recover for injuries suffered as a
result of blatant misconduct by U.S. forces without placing any
additional restraint on permissible military conduct. Soldiers in
combat would not be required to act any differently in order for
the exception to continue to apply.
Under this approach, if the activity in question is clearly
combat as it is commonly understood, the plaintiff will have to
show that the combat violated the rules of engagement in order
to proceed in court. This is not easily done because the rules of
engagement afford U.S. forces considerable discretion in acting to
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accomplish their missions and in defending themselves.145 Rules
of engagement permit the use of force proportional to a perceived
threat, while proscribing conduct that unnecessarily endangers
civilians.146 They appear to be aimed at allowing U.S. forces to
accomplish their missions as safely as possible for both
themselves and the surrounding civilian population.147
Therefore, they are very fitting guidelines for this proposed
approach, which strives to achieve an appropriate balance
between the government interest in waging war free from the
threat of liability and the recovery interests of unjustifiably
injured noncombatants.
As an example of how this proposed approach will use the
rules of engagement to strike that balance, consider an Iraqi
civilian injured as part of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2005. If
the injury resulted from the direction of hostile force, that
civilian would have to rebut the presumption that the combatant
activities exception applies by showing that the force used
violated the rules of engagement for that operation. If it did,
then the case should proceed because that would mean that the
U.S. military used unauthorized and unnecessary force.
The rules of engagement governing the use of force during
Operation Iraqi Freedom clearly stated that soldiers had “the
right to use necessary and proportional force” to defend
themselves, but also that “[m]ilitary operations will, in so far as
possible, minimize incidental injury, loss of life, and collateral
damage.”148 The rules also required that U.S. forces establish
with “a reasonable certainty that the proposed target is a
legitimate military target” prior to engagement.149 Therefore,
under this proposed approach, a civilian injured by U.S. forces
during Operation Iraqi Freedom would be able circumvent the
combatant activities exception only if the injury resulted from
the use of clearly disproportional and essentially indiscriminate
force.
Among the more glaring examples of conduct violating the
rules of engagement from the Iraq war was the killing of two
dozen unarmed civilians in the town of Haditha by U.S. Marines
145
146
147
148
149

See generally OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 124, at 73–102.
See id. at 97–102.
See id.
Id. at 102.
Id.
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in 2005.150 After a roadside bomb killed one Marine and wounded
two others, Staff Sergeant Frank Wuterich “[led] his troops to
disregard rules of combat” and “storm[] two nearby homes,
blasting their way in with gunfire and grenades.”151 The raid
resulted in the deaths of unarmed women and children, as well
as a man in a wheelchair.152 At a plea hearing as part of his
subsequent court martial, Wuterich admitted that prior to the
raid he told the squad to “shoot without hesitation, leading them
to believe they could ignore the rules of combat.”153 Wuterich
further admitted that, despite his training, he did not positively
identify his targets, and that at no time during the raid on the
homes did his squad take any gunfire or find any weapons.154 As
a result of this lethal and unsanctioned raid, Wutherich was
charged with manslaughter.155
This massacre exemplifies just the sort of indiscriminate and
clearly excessive force that the rules of engagement proscribe.156
It also therefore exemplifies the precise type of misconduct that,
under this proposed solution, would enable a plaintiff to
overcome the combatant activities exception. If the action in
question is so blatantly inappropriate as to—even in combat—
give rise to criminal charges, should it not then also be
sufficiently inappropriate to give rise to liability?
That soldiers would face criminal charges for this level of
misconduct serves not only to validate holding it as a basis for
liability, but also to abrogate perhaps the strongest criticism of
doing so: the potential chilling effect on soldiers. After all, it
could hardly be said that the prospect of tort liability is more
likely to lead soldiers to take undue precaution in assuring they
operate within the rules of engagement than is the existing
threat of criminal sanctions for failing to do so.
Imposing liability on the government for the use of
disproportional and indiscriminate force that violates the rules of
engagement is not unduly burdensome. In fact, the government
150

See Julie Watson, Marine Accepts Plea Deal in Iraqi Civilian Deaths,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 23, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/marine-accepts-plea-dealiraqi-civilian-deaths-193047300.html.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id.
155
Id.
156
See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
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has itself recognized as a legal principle, at least with respect to
the use of nuclear weapons, that a “distinction must be made at
all times between persons taking part in hostilities and members
of the civilian population to the effect that the latter be spared as
much as possible.”157 If this legal principle applies to the use of
weapons of mass destruction, surely it should apply to the use of
far more precise and discerning force as well. Furthermore,
based on Supreme Court precedent, violations of the rules of
engagement may be a basis for liability because the rules are
essentially sets of government regulations meant to prescribe
courses of action for soldiers to follow.158
CONCLUSION
The approach proposed in this Note provides a flexible
standard by which courts can determine whether or not the
combatant activities exception should be applied to shield the
government from liability for actions taken by the nation’s
military forces.
It allows unjustifiably injured parties an
opportunity to recover, while imposing no additional constraints
on soldiers.159 Therefore, it solves the dilemma of how to
compensate noncombatants injured by military action without
risking U.S. military interests. Soldiers can continue to fight and
function just as they always have. Only those injuries that could
clearly have been avoided without compromising national
security, and are therefore unjustifiable, will give rise to
liability.160
Based on Supreme Court precedent, this approach channels
the likely intent of Congress in drafting the combatant activities
exception and applies it in light of contemporary realities. It
protects the government from assuming liability that it never
intended to assume, while allowing recovery by those injured on
the rare occasions when the government goes beyond its selfimposed limitations on actions taken in national defense.

157
Burrus M. Carnahan, Nuclear Weapons, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE
PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 260, 260 (Roy Gutman et al. eds., 1999).
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See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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See supra Part V.
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See supra Part V.

